This paper analyzes the impact of IRCA 1986, a U.S. amnesty, on immigrants' 
Introduction
It is estimated that the population of illegal immigrants in the U.S. in 2005 is already over 11 million (Passel, 2005) . The large number of illegal immigrant population heats the policy debate about a potential new amnesty. While the debate has been ongoing for years, economists have investigated the consequence of Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the largest amnesty in the U.S. history, and found that legalization increases the economic wellbeing of the originally unauthorized immigrants (Rivera-Batiz, 1999; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002) and also benefits the development of their children in the U.S. (Pan, 2008) . This paper uses census data to further assess the impact of IRCA on immigrant men's and women's labor market outcomes and human capital development. The contributions of this paper to existing literature are as follows:
(a) I find that legalization benefits male and female immigrants in different ways.
Legalization increases male immigrants' wages as well as the returns to human capital.
Hence, men of high human capital receive more gains than men of little human capital.
Legalization has no impact on female immigrants' wage and the returns to human capital, but instead, increases women's labor force participation rate. 1 Women with little human capital increase slightly more than women with high human capital. (b) Legalization is also found to motivate immigrants to speak English better. (c) I also compare the medium-term impact of legal status with its long-term impact, which is not addressed by previous researchers.
IRCA took effect in 1986 and granted legal status to immigrants who had continuously lived in the U.S. since 1982. Rivera-Batiz (1999) and Kossoudji and CobbClark (2002) use the data from the Legalized Population Survey, a random sample of immigrants legalized under IRCA, to study the impact of IRCA on their wages. Both papers find that legalization increases male immigrants' wages by about 10-15%.
Legalization can also motivate immigrants to develop human capital. Two reasons can explain this. First, legal status increases the returns to human capital by allowing immigrants freedom in job-searching (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002) , which gives legalized immigrants incentives to accumulate more human capital, such as language skill (Chiswick 1995) . Second, legalization makes immigrants certain that they can permanently stay in the host country, which is another source of incentives to invest in the host-country specific human capital. Cortes (2004) finds that refugees, who are more likely to permanently stay in the U.S. than economic immigrants, improve in English more rapidly than the latter group. Dustmann (2007) finds that the probability of immigrants' permanent migration is positively associated with the educational investment in their sons.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of IRCA on immigrants' wage, labor By comparing the occupational choices and the returns to human capital between pre-1982 immigrants and post-1982 immigrants, I find that legalization raises the returns of human capital to male immigrants by allowing them upward occupational mobility.
However, upward occupational mobility of female immigrants does not change the average returns to human capital. Legalization benefit women mainly through increasing their labor force participation.
The remainder of this paper is organized in five sections: Section 2 introduces the legislative background of IRCA, describes the empirical strategy, and compares pre-1982
and post-1982 immigrants. Section 3 compares pre-1982 and post-1982 refugees and U.S.-born Latino workers. Section 4 discusses the mechanism through which legal status works. Section 5 studies the long-term impact of legal status. Section 6 concludes.
Pre-1982 and Post-1982 Latino Immigrants
Undocumented immigration became an issue for the United States in the 1970s. and plot the ratio of naturalized citizens to total immigrants by the entry year 3 (See Figure 1) . I restrict the sample of Latino immigrants to those who are living in California cities, who came to the U.S. as adult workers (at least 15 years old), and whose education is no more than high-school. These restrictions can make the contrast of the citizen ratio between pre-1982 and post-1982 cohorts as dramatic as possible. This strategy relies on one condition: immigrants arriving in different years are homogenous. Previous literature (Briggs, 2004) documents that IRCA was unexpectedly passed in 1986. Immigrants coming before 1986 did not anticipate this amnesty and thus could not react beforehand (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2003) . However, after the birth of IRCA, more illegal immigrants were induced to cross border, because the immigrants legalized by IRCA could make it easier for their relatives and friends to migrate (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2003 In Figure 2 , I plot Latino immigrants' English-speaking ability and labor market outcome in 1990 by their entry years. 5 Census 1990 codes year of entry by intervals, from which I choose four: 1975-1979, 1980-1981, 1982-1983, and 1984-1986 is a vector of excluded variables that determine only the propensity to work but not the wage. includes the number of children and the income of other family members.
The second stage (Equation 2b) is an OLS wage estimation, where is the inverse of Mill's ratio computed from the first stage.
The regression results are presented in Table 1 Table 1 , Columns 1, 4 and 6 control for a linear form of duration effect. The other columns control for a quadratic form of duration effect. Columns 3 and 8 add the English-speaking ability as an additional control variable. Table 1 
Besides experience and education, another important determinant of immigrants'
wages is the English-speaking ability. I test this by adding English-speaking ability as an additional control variable. For men, the variable is an indicator for speaking English well. For women, the variable is an indicator for being able to speak English. Column 3
shows that the wages of male immigrants who speak English well are 10% higher than those who do not. Column 8 shows that female immigrants who can speak English are six percentage points more likely to participate in the labor force than those who cannot.
Since the English-speaking ability rewards immigrants in the U.S. labor market, it is interesting to examine whether legalization would give immigrants more incentive to master the host country's language. I use the following Probit models (3a) and (3b) to test whether pre-1982 immigrant men and women speak English better than their post-1982 counterparts. Model (3a) is for men. Model (3b) is for women.
(3a) Pr speaking English well 1 Φ pre82 (3b) Pr being able to speak English 1 Φ pre82
The explanatory variables and are the same ones as in equation (1)-(2b). The regression results are presented in Table 2 , in which the left panel is for men's estimates and the right panel is for women's estimates. Columns (1) and (3) control for a linear form of duration effect, while Columns (2) and (4) control for a quadratic form of duration effect. (2004) and Dustmann (2007) that when an immigrant is more certain that she will stay in host country, she becomes more willing to invest in the host-country specific human capital.
Two Benchmark Groups: Refugees and US-born Latino Workers
Immigrants enter the U.S. labor market in different years. Cortes (2004) admits that the individuals from refugee-sending countries probably capture some illegal immigrants as well.
However, this measurement error will only make the refugee sample more similar to the Latino economic immigrants sample and upwardly bias the difference between pre-1982 refugees and post-1982 refugees. performance. This type of difference is assumed to be time-invariant. Therefore, I add the country of origin indicators to the right-hand side of models (1)-(3b) and use the country fixed-effects models for the empirical analysis of refugees. 8 Notice that the estimations of women's labor force participation (models (2a)) and immigrants' Englishspeaking ability (model (3a) and (3b)) now become fixed-effects Probit models. It is known that fixed effect estimators of Probit models can be biased. However, Fernandez-Val (2007) has shown that, the estimates derived from large-T panel data have negligible bias. In the setting of this paper, there are hundreds of observations for most of countries, which is certainly a large-T case. Therefore, I proceed Panel A of Table 4 A possible challenge to using refugees as a benchmark group is that refugees may receive assistance from refugee agencies for initial settlement, English tutoring, and job searching. These government agencies perhaps would like to work harder to help refugees when the economy is slow. The "unobservable" government help can distort the with fixed-effect Probit models and present the marginal effect estimates in Table 4 . As a robust check, I also use fixed-effect linear probability models. The estimates are very close to those in Table 4. comparison between pre-1982 and post-1982 refugees. Therefore, I use U.S.-born Latinos as a second benchmark group. 9 Like economic immigrants, the U.S.-born young people generally receive no particular assistance from government agencies when they start their first jobs. Both groups are independently subject to business cycles.
Panel B of Table 4 
How Does Legal Status Work?
In this section, I analyze why legal status generates a benefit to immigrants' wages.
Illegality restricts occupational choice for unauthorized immigrants. Unauthorized immigrant workers typically rely on the ethnic networks to get their first jobs (e.g., farm workers or food processing workers) in the U.S. (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2000 Next, I test whether pre-1982 immigrants' human capital receives higher returns than post-1982 immigrants. The same empirical models as equation (1) -(2b) are used, except that I add to the right-hand side of each equation the following interaction terms:
(pre82*duration in the U.S.), (pre82* the educational level indicators), and (pre82* the English-speaking ability indicator). The coefficients of the interaction terms measure the difference in returns to human capital between pre-1982 and post-1982 cohorts. These coefficients are hypothesized to be positive, meaning the returns to human capital is expected to be higher for pre-1982 (or legalized) immigrant workers.
The regression results are presented in Table 7 . Table 1 that pre-1982 female immigrants on average do not earn higher wages than post-1982 cohort either. These wage results appear to contradict to the upward occupational mobility of female immigrants that is presented in Table 6 . The explanation can be found
in Table 5 , which shows that female Service Workers and Laborers have the same mean of wages as female Farmers. Therefore, the shift from agricultural occupations to nonagricultural occupations as the result of legalization does not bring economic benefit to female immigrants. Then, what is the benefit of legalization to women? In Columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 , the coefficient of pre82 is significantly positive, while the coefficients of the interaction terms are insignificantly negative, which suggests that legalization increases the labor force participation rate of all pre-1982 female immigrants and the effect may be slightly stronger for women with little human capital than for women with high human capital. To sum it up, the impact of legalization on female immigrants' labor market outcomes is different from that on male immigrants. Legalization increases female immigrants' propensity to work rather than wages. And women with little human capital rather than those with high human capital receive more gains out of legalization.
The Long-term Impact of Legal Status
In The mechanism through which legalization benefits male immigrants is that men are more likely to work on agricultural jobs instead of agricultural jobs after being legalized, and consequently their human capital receives higher returns. Therefore, men with higher human capital actually gain more from legalization than men with little human capital. Female immigrants are also found to move upward from agricultural jobs.
However, non-agricultural jobs do not pay higher wages to women than agricultural jobs.
Therefore, upward occupational mobility does not bring economic benefit to female immigrants. The way that legalization benefits women is by increasing their labor force participation rate. And the magnitude of increase is slightly larger for women with little human capital than for women with higher human capital. (Passel, 2005) .
Therefore, by focusing on the Californian Latino immigrant population, the sample contains a large proportion of illegal immigrant. Second, the sample is restricted to city residents. With this restriction, I try to exclude agricultural workers who can still be legalized under SAW, even if they arrived in the U.S. after 1982. Appendix Table 1 presents the distribution of sampled immigrants by cities. Among the 22 California cities identified in the Census 2000 5% sample, Los Angeles accounts for 55% of the immigrant population. Therefore, the results of this paper are mainly determined by the residents of this city. Third, the sampled immigrants' age at arrival must be at least 15 years old. For young immigrants, the year of entry is not a critical factor for legal status.
U.S. immigration policy favors a family reunion. Consequently, a child immigrant who arrived after 1982 can still have legal status, if her parents were pre-1982 immigrants.
Fourth, the sampled immigrants' educational attainment is no more than high-school graduate degree. The reason for this restriction is that low-skilled urban immigrant workers were the main beneficiaries of the pre-1982 amnesty program. They perhaps could never have had legal status, if there had not been such an amnesty. Hence, with the above four restrictions, the probability of having legal status between pre-1982 and post-1982 cohorts should be dramatically different.
Appendix B
The Measurement of English-speaking Ability
In census data, an individual's English-speaking ability is defined by one of the following five cases: (1) speaks only English, (2) speaks very well, (3) speaks well, (4) speaks English but not well, or (5) does not speak English. I construct an indicator for speaking English well, which is one if an individual is in case (1), (2), or (3), and zero otherwise. I also construct another indicator for speaking English, which is one if an individual is in case (1), (2), (3) or (4), and zero otherwise.
The Definition of the Year of Entry and Duration of Work for U.S.-born People
For U.S. born people who have at least 8 years of schooling, the year of entry is the year in which they finished schooling, and their duration of work can be calculated by (age -6 -years of schooling). For those whose education is less than 8 years, consider that in the U.S. the minimum age for employment is 14, the year of entry is set to be the year that they reach 14, and duration is (age -14). : 1975-1979, 1980-1981, 1982-1984, and 1985-1986. I : 1975-1979, 1980-1981, 1982-1984, and 1985-1986 . I use the middle year to represent each interval. Only Mexican and Central American (except Cuban and Haitian) immigrants who entered the U.S. at an age no less than 15, not older than 45 in 1990, years of schooling were no more than 12 years, and resided in Californian cities are in use. Sources : Census 1990 Public Use 5% Micro Sample (PUMS). The results are presented in Column 6. The variables excluded in the first stage but included in the second stage are number of children and the income from other family members. The coefficients shown in Columns 6 are marginal effects. 2. The other control variables for men include an indicator of high-school graduation, an indicator of 9-11 years of schooling, a quadratic form of age, and an indicator for marital status. 3. Standard errors are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
